This paper examines the policy positions of Chilean senators. The empirical analysis focuses on two different legislative activities: voting and coauthoring bills. The roll call analysis evaluates the degree to which coalitions act as cohesive policy teams on the floor of Congress, whether parties' positions match conventional ideological rankings, and the dimensionality of voting decisions. The coauthorship analysis provides alternative ideal points to examine similar questions. The findings of the voting analysis reveal a rather unidimensional world with two distinct clusters matching coalitional affiliation, while the analysis of coauthorship illuminates a more complex pattern of associations. Neither roll call votes nor coauthorship patterns, however, reveal substantive fissures within the governing coalition. In comparison, the opposition coalition appears more divided along partisan lines.
T he transformation of the Chilean party system following the military dictatorship has attracted considerable attention among political scientists. Unlike most Latin American nations, Chile had a long tradition of parliamentary politics before the 1973 coup, and a wealth of research examined the evolution of the party system from its 19 th century origins to the 1970s. For the most part, legislative studies focusing on the contemporary period support the view that a fundamental realignment of the party system characterized the most recent transition to democracy. 1 They reveal a bipolar mapping of legislators' preferences, with members of the Chamber of Deputies clustered around two coalitions.
Such a distribution of partisan preferences differs from the conventional characterization of the party system in the pre-1973 era, which portrays a tripartite grouping along ideological parties. This makes the Concertación the most stable government coalition in the history of democratic Latin America. Opposing it is the Alianza coalition, 3 which unites two parties of the ideological right founded in the 1980s: National Renewal (RN) and the Independent Democrat Union (UDI). This configuration of partisan alliances contrasts sharply with the feeble alliances that characterized the party system during the prior democratic period .
Christian Democrats and Socialists moved from being bitter adversaries in the early 1960s to declared enemies by the time of the military coup. However, since the transition to democracy, the two partisan groups have worked as close allies. A distinctive centre, acting independently from the interests of the left and the right -i.e., the Christian Democrats or the Radical Party before the 1970s -has not been a typical characteristic of the contemporary Chilean party system. Instead, the reconciliation between the centre and left, and the fault line dividing them from parties on the ideological right, define the new party system.
The two alliances originally formed at the end of military rule, taking opposite sides in the referendum for the continuation of General Augusto Pinochet's government. Since then, they have dominated the composition of Congress, and their candidates have received an overwhelming majority of the votes cast in presidential elections. Some research has highlighted the influence of electoral rules in cementing these coalitions. 4 Under the
binominal system (open list with district magnitude = 2), dropping from one of the two main district lists entails significant electoral risks. 5 Studies have also highlighted persistent discrepancies in the political preferences of Concertación and Alianza supporters, and the relevance of coalition labels for Chilean voters. 6 In addition, the stability of the government coalition has been fostered by a political class accustomed to the benefits of office.
Legislative studies have examined the voting behaviour of legislators in the Chilean
Congress to evaluate, among other things, the degree of coalition cohesiveness (Carey 2002; Morgenstern 2004; Toro Maureira 2007; Alemán and Saiegh 2007) . All these analyses highlight the high unity levels of the governing coalition, with the evidence based mainly on roll calls votes taken in the Chamber of Deputies. Alemán and Saiegh (2007) , for example,
show that Christian Democrat deputies hold preferences that are almost indistinguishable from those of their leftist allies. Their analysis reveals that voting in the lower chamber is well represented in one dimension, with coalition and ideological differences explaining most of the variation present in the roll call data. No comparable works exist for voting on the Senate floor and the only contemporary analysis of legislative positions in the Chilean Senate is Londregan's (2000) analysis of voting in three congressional committees.
Londregan, who focuses on the period immediately following democratization (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) The empirical analysis that follows extends prior research in two critical ways.
First, it provides the first analysis of roll call votes taken in the Chilean Senate. Given the importance of the Senate in Chilean politics, evidence drawn solely from behaviour in the lower chamber paints an incomplete picture of congressional politics. It remains to be seen whether bipolarity and unidimensionality also characterize floor choices in the Senate, where partisan constraints are arguably less stringent. The political careers of senators are comparatively less dependent on the whims of coalition leaders than those of deputies, and senators tend to be more well-known and possess more experience as professional politicians than members of the Chamber of Deputies. Given that from 1990 to 2006 the government held a clear majority in the Chamber of Deputies (but not the Senate), it could also be argued that senators experienced greater opportunities to become independent actors in policy bargaining than the more easily whipped Deputies in the larger government-dominated chamber. Therefore, if the empirical analysis fails to find substantive behavioural differences between senators and deputies at the time of voting on bills, this would strengthen the concept of bipolarity presented by earlier studies.
The second way in which the empirical analysis presented here extends earlier work is by analysing information on bill coauthorship. Data on initiated bills provides an alternative source of information about the policy positions and individual relationships that senators develop. The legislative literature has begun paying considerable attention to bill coauthorship activity, with some authors portraying cosponsorship as a (low-cost) positiontaking device targeting electoral constituents (Balla and Nemacheck 2000; Campbell 1982; Highton and Rocca 2005; Mayhew 1974 In short, partisan and/or constituency pressure is more likely to act as a constraining force on plenary votes than in the choice of coauthors at the bill initiation phase. This means that party leaders, through agenda-setting mechanisms, old-style whipping or selective inducements (i.e., patronage), are more likely to structure floor votes than tightly control the bill initiation and coauthorship process. In addition, the ability of individual legislators to strategically signal fellow legislators or specific constituent groups should be greater at the initiation phase. Coauthorship choices should also be likely to reflect some degree of mutual trust between initiators, besides commonalities with the policy at hand. 
ideal Points from recorded roll Call Votes
Most of the techniques associated with measuring individual preferences and party unity focus on the analysis of congressional votes. Plenary votes often hold relevant policy consequences and are important to legislative parties. Interest groups, the media and constituents also tend to pay greater attention to such votes and their consequences than to any other single congressional activity. Given the above, it is not surprising that a rich literature has grown from the analysis of congressional votes.
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The first method employed here to recover senators' ideal points from roll call votes is Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) Senator Jorge Lavandero (DC) was replaced halfway through his term by Senator Guillermo Vásquez (PRSD). Among these senators, a group of ten exists that were not popularly elected: six appointed senators associated with the Alianza, as well as three appointed senators and one former President (Eduardo Frei) associated with Concertación.
The results of applying w-nominate to the roll call data are plotted in Figure 1 In sum, the results derived from the roll call analysis convey two salient findings.
Firstly, they reveal a party system organized around two cohesive coalitions that tend to adopt distinct policy positions. There is no separate centre composed of "moderate" members of both coalitions; instead, voting behaviour reflects unity between leftists and Christian Democrats, foes before the military coup. Secondly, the voting data is accurately captured in one dimension. The central force driving positions in the first dimension is coalitional affiliation. Within the two coalitions, differences tend to reflect the ideological ranking of parties commonly present in the literature on Chilean politics. It should also be noted that both blocs differ not only in electoral goals and ideological positions, but also in their adherence to the government or the opposition. These overlapping influences also contribute to the bipolar clustering of positions observed on the first dimension.
Bill Coauthorship Links
The underlying dimensions of political conflict in Congress should also be reflected in the analysis of coauthorship ties. After all, voting and coauthoring represent two sets of bill-related choices made by the same senators. The constraints and incentives behind coauthorship choices, however, are unlike those surrounding plenary votes. This leads us to expect greater cross-partisan connections and higher dimensionality. It can be argued that mathematical dimensions do not necessarily coincide with the substantive ideological dimension, which appears to run in a diagonal fashion. One technique that aids in interpreting the structure of spatial maps is using the estimated dimensions as independent variables in a simple linear regression where the dependent variable is a characteristic of the legislators, such as ideology (Poole 2005, 152-154) . The line drawn in Figure 4 was created by regressing the score produced by the first dimension of w-nominate (proxy for ideology) on the two coauthorship components. 21 Coefficients of the independent variables are used as elements of a normal vector, which together with its reflection contribute to form the line added in Figure 4 . Moving from "ideological left"
to "ideological right", the predicted values run from the lowest to the highest possible.
The dashed line perpendicular to this vector signals the ideological centre; senators below it "should be" from the ideological centre-left, and those above it "should be" from the ideological centre-right. it can be said that these two senators occupy a middle position between both groups in the network, they are not ideological centrists (according to optimal classification, Silva
Cimma and Viera-Gallo are ranked 3 and 11, respectively).
Conclusion
The empirical analyses of roll call and coauthorship data present complementary views on the behaviour of Chilean senators. On the one hand, the analysis of voting reveals a rather unidimensional world, with two distinct clusters matching coalitional affiliation.
When dissent exists in plenary votes, coalition unity tends to prevail. In addition, senators' positions along the main dimension correlate with conventional ideological rankings. These findings coincide with those presented by Alemán and Saiegh (2007) However, the opposition coalition appears comparatively more divided along partisan lines. This is consistent with earlier empirical work focusing on the lower chamber that portrays Alianza as less unified on floor votes. The results also suggest that the elimination of appointed senators (institucionales) -effective since the second trimester of 2006 -would probably lead to greater cohesiveness within Alianza. However, the inverse of this change is a potential lowering of cross-coalition links in bill initiation.
In conclusion, the bipolarity evident in roll call votes and electoral competition does
